Time: Friday April 12, 9:00-10:00 AM (BJT)

Zoom: 363 486 0760

Presenter: Hsu Yumin Wang, Ph.D. Candidate at Emory University

Discussant: Dong Zhang, Assistant Professor at HKUST

Abstract:

It is widely believed that autocratic rulers can contain mass discontent and garner political support by introducing progressive redistributive programs. However, such received wisdom overlooks the reality that many of the programs are partially fulfilled and may not meet popular expectations. What is the effect of partially fulfilled redistribution (PFR, hereafter) on regime support? This paper answers this question by focusing on China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law, whose policy promises are often compromised in the process of judicial enforcement. I argue that the effect of PFR can be decomposed into two components: backlash against unfulfilled expectations and gains over status quo. Using a pre-registered online survey experiment, I offer, to my knowledge, the first experimental test on the effect of PFR. The findings indicate that, for rulers, PFR does not significantly decrease regime support when compared to inaction on grievances. Further analysis suggests that PFR, if it continues to deliver benefits, may mitigate the backlash resulting from unmet expectations, leading to more mixed and ambivalent attitudes towards the regime among the public. This study contributes to our understanding of the intricate dynamics of authoritarian control and the mass political effects of redistribution.

Presenter’s Bio:

Hsu Yumin Wang is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Emory University. His research lies at the intersection of autocratic politics, the political economy of redistribution, and comparative judicial politics, with a regional focus on East Asia. His solo-authored work has been published by Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics, and Political Behavior.